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Abstract. A sharing community prospers when participation and contribution are both
high. We suggest the two, while being related decisions every peer makes, should be given
separate rational bases. Considered as such, a basic issue is the viability of club formation,
which necessitates the modelling of two major sources of heterogeneity, namely, peers and
shared content. This viability perspective clearly explains why rational peers contribute (or
free-ride when they don’t) and how their collective action determines viability as well as
the size of the club formed. It also exposes another fundamental source of limitation to
club formation apart from free-riding, in the community structure in terms of the relation
between peers’ interest (demand) and sharing (supply).
1 Introduction
Much current research in peer-to-peer systems focuses on performance of the platform on which
peers transact. Even when incentives of the peers themselves are considered, the concern is with
their effects on the system load. Invariably, selfish peers are assumed always ready to participate.
Incentive mechanisms are then necessary to make sure they behave nicely and do not cause
excessive load. As this performance perspective dominates the research agenda, free-riding is
often identified as a major problem, a limiting factor to be dealt with.
In reality, free-riding [1] is in fact very common in open access communities, including many
successful file sharing networks on the Internet where incentive mechanisms are often scant or
absent altogether [2, 3]. A problem in principle does not appear to be a problem in practice. An
empirical observation offers a straightforward explanation: many peers are seemingly generous
with sharing their private assets. They upload files for sharing, help one another in resource
discovery, routing, caching, etc. As long as sufficiently many are contributing, free-riding may be
accommodated and the community would sustain. But then why are they so generous?
Our study is in part motivated by Feldman et al. [4] who explains this in terms of peers’
intrinsic generosity. Assuming that a peer’s generosity is a statistical type variable and he would
contribute as long as his share of the total cost does not exceed it, they show that some peers
would choose to contribute even as others free-ride, as long as sufficiently many peers have high
enough generosity. However, how the generosity is derived is left open. In contrast, [5] identifies
a rational basis for peers to contribute based on a utility function predicated on the benefit
of information access, which is improved as peers contribute in load sharing that eases system
congestion. They demonstrate also that a sharing community may sustain in the face of free-
riding without any explicit incentive mechanism.
1.1 Why peers participate?
In this paper, we contend that there remains another important basic question to examine,
namely, why peers participate in the first place. It is of course reasonable to assume simply that
peers do so for their own benefit. However, it is crucial to note that peers often benefit differently,
even as they participate to the same extent and contribute to the same extent. In a file sharing
community for instance, the benefit a peer sees would depend on whether he finds what he is
interested in there, which should vary from peer to peer. In this regard, the studies cited above
and many others essentially assume that peers have identical interest and sees the same benefit
potential from a sharing community, which is obviously not very realistic.
1.2 Goods type and peer type
As peers exhibit different interest, they would demand different things in their participation.
It follows that the system serving a sharing community (the club) comprising such peers would
have content with a variety of goods. The availability of the goods a peer demands from the club
would determine the benefit potential he sees, and the extent of his participation. Two new type
variables are implied: first, a type variable for different goods, and second, a peer type variable
for different interests in the goods. For simplicity, we may replace the second by some measure of
his propensity-to-participate, as a proxy variable conditioned on a given club with its particular
content.
We believe the new type variables are essential to analyzing realistic peer-to-peer systems. We
shall demonstrate this by constructing a generic model of an information sharing club (ISC) [6]
in which peers contribute by sharing information goods. Such shared goods then make up the
club’s content which in turn entice peers to participate and contribute.
1.3 Viability perspective
Unlike models taking the performance perspective, the ISC model takes a viability perspective
and focuses instead on a more primary concern of whether the club itself has any chance to grow
in size at all. In principle, this would depend on a mutual sustenance between club membership
and content. This concern turns out to subsume free-riding, and reveals another fundamental
source of limitation, in community structure in terms of the relation between demand and supply
among the sharing peers. Generally speaking, insufficient interdependence among them for their
interested goods would limit their propensity-to-participate and the size of the club they form.
In the worst case, the club may get stuck in a deadlock with few members and little content, even
emptiness, when there is little overlap between their interest (demand) and potential contribution
(supply).
We begin our discussion in the next section by re-visiting the question of why rational
peers contribute. We shall derive another peer type variable – the propensity-to-contribute (c.f.
generosity of [4]) – from the peer’s utility function of benefit and cost that arises from both
participation and contribution. As a result, we come up with new insight regarding free-riding,
in particular, when and why even generous peers may cease to contribute. Section 3 introduces
the concept of goods type and club content as a distribution over goods types, and how a club may
prosper on a mutual sustenance between its membership and content. Section 4 describes the ISC
model and derives two viability conditions. We demonstrate how the community structure affects
viability in simplistic model instances with two goods types. In the final section, we discuss the
design of incentive systems in the face of two different sources of limitation, namely, free-riding
and community structure.
2 Why do rational peers share?
Let peer i’s contribution (or cost) to a club be Ci and the club’s benefit to him is Bi. Further
assume that each peer’s choice of Ci directly affects its benefit (therefore, Bi is a function of
Ci among other things). The peer’s utility, a function of both the benefit and cost, is given by
Ui(Bi, Ci). It is intuitive to assume that Ui is decreasing in Ci and concave increasing in Bi.
Given any particular level of contribution Ci and a corresponding level of benefit Bi, any small
increment of utility is given by
δUi(Bi, Ci) = (∂Ui/∂Bi)δBi + (∂Ui/∂Ci)δCi .
The (non-negative) ratio
−
∂Ui/∂Bi
∂Ui/∂Ci
then gives us the (marginal) exchange rate of peer i’s contribution to benefit. In other words,
it is the maximum amount of contribution the peer would give in exchange for an extra unit of
benefit with no net utility loss.
Although we have not yet described how to determine the club’s benefit to a particular peer
Bi, it suffices to say that the value of ∂Bi/∂Ci represents the club (marginal) response to peer i’s
contribution, per current levels of benefit and cost at (Bi, Ci). Of particular interest is whether
this club response to peer i’s initial contribution, viz ∂Bi/∂Ci|Ci=0, is enticing enough. The
answer can be different for each peer. Specifically, peer i would contribute only if
(
∂Bi
∂Ci
∣∣∣∣
Ci=0
)−1
< Γi
△
= −
∂Ui/∂Bi
∂Ui/∂Ci
∣∣∣∣
Ci=0
. (1)
Otherwise, he prefers not to contribute and free-ride when he actually joins the club for the
good benefit he sees. Note that Γi is a property derived from the peer’s utility function, and
may serve as a type variable to characterize different peers. We refer to this property as a peer’s
propensity-to-contribute.
Therefore, we have tied a peer’s decision to his contribution to a club to two quantities,
namely, his propensity-to-contribute Γi and the club response ∂Bi/∂Ci which depends on the
specific club model. This treatment of peers as rational agents is similar to the formulation in [5].
It is also compatible with [4], in that each peer ends up being characterized by a type variable.
The difference is that [4] chose not to further explain how its type variable of generosity, is
derived. Another major difference is that Γi is dependent on Bi. When Ui is concave increasing
in Bi due to decreasing marginal return of benefit, Γi would decrease as Bi increases. In other
words, improved benefit reduces a peer’s propensity-to-contribute.
Furthermore, the club response ∂Bi/∂Ci would also tend to decrease as Bi increases. A club
already offering high benefit to a peer has less potential to reward further to incentivize his
contribution. The club response may even reduce to naught when the maximum benefit is being
offered. In this case, peer i would cease to contribute and join as a free-rider, even when his
propensity-to-contribute may not be small.
In summary, as a club prospers and peers see improving benefit, the motivation to contribute
would reduce on two causes: decrease in peer’s propensity-to-contribute and decrease in club
response. The latter is caused by decreasing marginal benefit of a prosperous club, which we
identify as another systematic cause of free-riding (apart from peers not being generous enough).
3 What do peers share?
Before a peer decides whether to contribute based on the marginal benefit, he first decides
whether to join based on the benefit itself, namely, Bi. Research works that focus on incentive
schemes often study Bi as a function of the peer’s decision to contribute, namely, Ci, only, whence
the two decisions are not differentiated and become one. Consequently, peers who contribute the
same see the same benefit potential. This is the assumption we call into question here.
A salient feature of many real world peer-to-peer systems is the variety of goods being shared.
The benefit that a peer receives is dependent on what he demands in the first place, and whether
they are available in the current club content. Even if two peers contribute the same and demand
the same, the benefit they receive would differ in general. Peers with similar interests would see
similar benefit potential while peers with different interests may not. Therefore, a peer’s interest,
in terms of the types of goods he demands, is an important type variable. However, this would
be a distribution over all goods types, which is complicated. To account for peer i’s particular
interest in relation to a given club, the benefit on offer, viz. Bi, would suffice. As benefit is the
primary motivation for him to participate, Bi would qualify as a measure of his propensity-to-
participate, a proxy variable for his interest conditioned on the given club.
The assumption often made, that peers contributing the same receive the same benefit,
implicitly implies a single goods type. This would be a gross over-simplification that ignores
the variety of goods as a principal source of peer heterogeneity. Consequently, it would overlook
important structural properties of both club membership and content essential for a detailed
analysis of the dynamics of club formation.
3.1 Club formation, membership and content
A club would attract a peer by its range of shared goods, and to an extent which depends on
the availability of the goods he demands. As a result, it would tend to attract peers who are
interested in its available content. At the same time, such peers contribute to the club’s content
with what they share. Such is the essence of a sharing community: peers come together by virtue
of the overlap between the range of goods they share (supply) and the range they are interested
in (demand). With benefit (Bi) as peer’s propensity-to-participate, he determines his extent of
participation. With Γi as a threshold for the club response, as his propensity-to-contribute, he
determines whether to contribute during participation.
The mutual relation between peers’ demand and supply is suggestive of potentially complex
coupled dynamics of club membership and content. A club would prosper on virtuous cycles
of gains in membership and content, and would decline on vicious cycles of losses in both. If
and when a club sustains would depend on the existence and size of any stable equilibrium. In
particular, when an empty club is a stable equilibrium, it signifies a deadlock between insufficient
content and insufficient membership. Otherwise, an empty club would be unstable and self-start
on the slightest perturbation, growing towards some statistical equilibrium with a positive club
size. In the following, we refer to such a club as being viable, and viability is synonymous to
instability of an empty club.
4 A simple sharing model
Here we present a simple model of an information sharing club (ISC), sharing information goods
which are non-rivalrous1.
The model is based on two kinds of entities: a population N (size N) of peers, and a set S
of information goods. In addition, we assume the following characteristics about these peers:
1. Each peer has a supply of information goods which is available for sharing once the peer
joins the ISC.
2. Each peer has a demand for information goods in the ISC.
The purpose of the model is to determine, based on the characteristics of the peer population,
whether an ISC will form2; and if so, what is the size of this club and its content. At the heart
of the model is an assumption about how a peer decides whether he joins the club. This decision
process can be modelled as a function of a given peer’s demand function, and a club’s content.
In other words, given a club with certain content (of information goods), a peer would join the
club if his demand (for information goods) can be sufficiently met by the club. So we complete a
cycle: given some content in the club, we can compute a peer’s decision whether to join a club;
given the peers’ decisions we can compute the collective content of the club; from the content,
we can compute if additional peers will join the club. This process can always be simulated.
With suitable mathematical abstraction, this process can also be represented as a fixed point
relationship that yields the club size (and content) as its solution [6].
In our mathematical abstraction, we let peer i’s demand be represented by a probability
distribution hi(s), and his supply be represented by another distribution gi(s), where s indexes
the information goods in S. For simplicity, we normally assume hi(s) = h(s) and gi(s) = g(s)
for all i. Further, a peer’s decision to join a club is based on a probability Pi(n), where n is the
number of peers already in the club. Let us consider what these assumptions mean (we will come
back to what Pi(n) is later). First, by representing a peer’s supply (of information goods) using
a common probability distribution, we can easily derive the distribution of the resultant content
of a club of n peers. Second, given a peer’s demand and a club’s content, both as probability
distributions, it is possible to characterize whether a peer joins a club as a Bernoulli trial (where
Pi gives the probability of joining, and 1 − Pi gives the probability of leaving a club). Thirdly,
1 Unlike rivalrous goods such as bandwidth or storage which are congestible, non-rivalrous goods may
be consumed concurrently by many users without degradation. Information goods are inherently non-
rivalrous as they may be readily replicated at little or no cost.
2 Theoretically, it is also possible that more than one clubs will form, although the analysis of multiple
club scenarios is outside the scope of this paper.
the composition of the club (if formed) is not deterministic; rather it is given by the statistical
equilibrium with peers continually joining and leaving.
As a result, the club content is given by a probability distribution composed from the supplies
of n peers, where n is the expected size of the club. Each peer’s joining probability, Pi(n), is then
given by
Pi(n)
△
= Ehi(s)[1− e
−ρi Φ(n) g(s)] (2)
where g(s), s ∈ S is the distribution of information good shared and available in the club over a
goods type domain S, and hi(s) is a distribution representing of peer i’s interest over S. Here,
Φ(n) represents the total quantity of information goods found in the club if n peers joined, which
is given by
Φ(n) = nk¯ + φ0 (3)
where k¯ is an average peer’s potential contribution (realized when he actually joins the club)
and φ0 ≥ 0 represents some seed content of the club. The rationale for equation (2) is as follows.
Given any specific s demanded by the considered peer, the expected number of copies of it in
the club is given by Φ(n)g(s). We assume the probability of not finding this item in the club
exponentially diminishes with the quantity, which means the probability of finding that item
is 1 − e−ρi Φ(n) g(s). Since the demand of the considered peer is actually a distribution hi(s),
therefore this peer’s likely satisfaction is expressed as an expectation over the information goods
he may demand. Finally,
ρi = ρ(Ki) ∈ [0, 1] (4)
is search efficiency that peer i sees, which is made dependent on his contribution Ki by some
incentive system of the club to encourage contribution so that ρ(Ki) is monotonically increasing
in Ki.
In this model, the benefit of the club to a peer is the extent the peer chooses to join, viz
Bi = Pi; the cost (of contribution), on the other hand, is simply Ci = Ki.
4.1 Peer dynamics: joining and leaving
In figure (1) the club is depicted as the smaller oval, and the flux of peers continually joining and
leaving the club statistically is driven by peers’ propensity-to-participate (the distribution of Pi).
The figure also depicts the partition of the universe into the set of potentially contributing peers
(the white area), and the set of non-contributing peers (the lightly shaded area). This division
is driven by the population’s propensity-to-contribute (the distribution of Γi).
By definition, non-contributing peers have no effect on Φ or Pi. Therefore, we may refine the
ISC model to ignore them and focus on the potentially contributing peers (pc-peers), namely,
the population N (size N) is the population of pc-peers and n is the number of pc-peers in the
club. Subsequently, k¯ = 1/N
∑
Ki>0
Ki and Ki > 0 is the positive contribution of pc-peer i.
However, the population of pc-peers is actually dependent on n, viz. N and N should really
be N (n) and N(n). Since the incoming rate P¯ (n) 3 depends on n, it gives rise to a fixed point
equation
P¯ (n) N(n) = n (5)
for the statistical equilibrium club size indicated by n.
As pointed out in Section 2, prosperity reduces the motivation to contribute and some
population in the white area would cease to be (potentially) contributing and moved to the
shaded part. However, we shall assume N(n) to be roughly constant here when we are studying
the club’s viability property which is pre-emptive to prosperity and determined by the club
dynamics around n = 0.
3 P¯ (n) = E[Pi(n)] is the average joining probability. Assuming independence between the participation
and contribution decisions, the average is the same when taken over either all peers or the potentially
contributing peers only.
n
P¯ (n)
1−P¯ (n)
N(n)
The universe
Fig. 1. Peer dynamics of the ISC model
4.2 Statistical equilibrium of membership and content
The fixed point equation (5) characterizes a statistical equilibrium club size when the rates of
incoming and outgoing members of the club are balanced [6]. Consequently, we have the following
proposition :
Proposition 1 (Sufficient viability condition).
N(0)
∑
s
g(s)h(s) > (k¯ ρ(0+))−1 > 0 (6)
is sufficient for the empty club to be unstable where h(s) is the expected demand distribution4.
The club is viable with a positive equilibrium club size that satisfies equation (5).
The membership dynamics and content dynamics are closely coupled : as pc-peers join and leave,
they alter the total shared content, inducing others to revise their join/leave decisions. Pc-peer
i would contribute on joining as long as his initial contribution could improve his utility, as
discussed in section 2.
Whether some peers remain potentially contributing even when the club is empty is essential
to viability; N(0) has to be strictly positive. This leads to our second proposition :
Proposition 2 (Necessary viability condition).
ρ′(0)φ0 > 0 . (7)
This means some positive incentive to entice a peer to become a contributor (from a non-
contributor) and some seed content, viz. φ0 > 0, are needed for a club to be viable and not
get stuck in an empty state with no contributing peers. (However, while more seed content
improves viability as well as participation (Pi), it would also tend to reduce N the same way
that prosperity does. The equilibrium club size would increase only if this reduction is more than
offset by the increase in Pi.)
4.3 Community structure
Since the basis for club formation is the overlap between peers’ interest and the club’s content,
an interesting question is whether peers tend to form small clubs due to clustering of common
interest, or large clubs with diverse population of peers. Furthermore, given a club of multiple
information goods, can it be decomposed and analyzed as multiple clubs of single goods? The
answers to these questions would shed more light on why it is important to model an information
sharing club based on content.
4 h(s) is the demand the club sees and would be a weighted average of peers’s demand, with the weights
being their demand rates.
Suppose we have two disjoint clubs with equilibrium club sizes n1 and n2, formed
independently based on their respective potentially contributing peer populations N1 and N2.
When they are brought together, it is intuitive that a new club would form with at least size
n1 + n2. We refer to this as mixing (two clubs). A key question is : will the size of the new club,
n, be strictly greater than n1 + n2?
We devise two simple simulated examples below to study the effect of mixing.
First, consider a universe with only two types of information goods and two independent clubs,
each with peers interested in a different single goods type only. However, when they contribute,
they may share some percentage q of the other goods types. The demand and supply distributions
are shown in table 1. Further we assume k¯ρ = 0.015; N1 = N2 = 100 such that both clubs are
viable (when q is reasonably small) according to proposition 1. Therefore q may be regarded as
the degree of overlap between the two clubs’ supply.
Table 1. Two population and two goods type scenario
peers demand supply
type 1 {1, 0} {1− q, q}
type 2 {0, 1} {q, 1− q}
We obtained (by simulation) the equilibrium club sizes n1 and n2 when the populations N1
and N2 are separate, and then the equilibrium club size n when they are mixed. Figure (2) shows
the gain in the mixed club size, as the ratio n
n1+n2
. With no overlap (q = 0), the mixed club size
n is simply the sum of the two individual clubs (n1 + n2). However a larger club is formed with
rapidly increasing gain as the overlap increases. A two-fold gain results with a moderate overlap
of 20%.
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Fig. 2. Effect of mixing clubs when both are viable
Our second example considers the same two populations with the total size N1 +N2 = 200,
except thatN1 > N2 so that the second population do not make a viable club this time. Figure (3)
shows what happens when these two populations are mixed with various degrees of overlap. For
a good range of N2, the non-viable club is able to form (as part of the larger mixed club) with
different vigor monotonically increasing in q. These two examples demonstrate how the modeling
of goods types help account for club formation: a high degree of overlap between peers’ supply and
demand is conducive to large club formation, and vice versa. When a large club is formed with
significant mixing, it comprises gain in membership and content over any constituent specialized
clubs, and is structurally different from their mere union.
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Fig. 3. Effect of mixing clubs on the non-viable club (type 2 peers)
4.4 Discussions
Our reasoning and analysis has so far assumed a non-rivalrous relation among peers. In practice,
there always are rivalrous resources which peers may contend for sooner or later. For example,
bandwidth could be scarce when delivering large files and storage space may be limited. As a
club increases in size, diseconomy of scale due to such contention would set in and prohibit large
club formation. Benefit to peers would suffer, perhaps as a consequence of a reduction in search
efficiency ρi. In this case, the tendency to form smaller clubs with more specialized content would
increase. However, economy of scale may also be at work, most notably, due to statistical effects
(e.g. multiplexing gain) and/or network effects5, which would increase the tendency to form
larger clubs with a diverse population of peers.
5 Concluding remarks: incentivizing sharing
The ISC example demonstrates that the overlap between peers’ interest (demand) in and sharing
(supply) of the variety of goods is crucial. This two goods type example, while simplistic, is
suggestive of the important role played by peers who share a wider variety of goods. They may
help induce virtuous cycles that improve membership and content, resulting in a larger club size.
Further, they may help niche peer groups, otherwise not viable, to benefit from participating in
a more mixed and larger community. Therefore it is conceivable that such sharing creates more
“synergy” than more specialized supplies. In economics term, they create positive externality
and should justify positive incentives.
The viability perspective points to the importance of maintaining a large N(n) for viability
is instructive to the design of incentive mechanisms. In other words, the more potentially
contributing peers the better. Contribution should be encouraged especially when starting up a
club, as viability depends on a large enough N(0).
However, it should be emphasized that encouraging contribution may not entail discouraging
free-riding. One may imagine free-riders who are discouraged by some negative incentive schemes
simply demand less without becoming contributing peers, and the club does not become more
viable. A positive scheme that aims to increase N(n) directly is always preferred. A reasonable
principle in economizing the use of incentive schemes would be to focus on those peers who are
bordering on free-riding, by virtue of their propensity-to-contribute and/or the club response, to
coerce them into contributing.
In fact, a club’s well-being may actually be harmed when free-riding is overly discouraged.
First, free-riders may behave differently and become contributors if only they stay long enough
to realize more benefits in participation. Second, they may be useful audience to others, e.g. in
newsgroups, BBS and forums, where wider circulation may improve utility of all due to network
effects.
5 Network effects are diametrically opposite to sharing costs [7] (due to consumption of rivalrous
resources, say). They would help make good a non-rivalrous assumption made in the presence of
the latter.
However, the ISC example has made two key assumptions, namely, constant N(n) and
non-rivalrous resources, so as to focus on the viability of club formation. In reality, the two
limiting factors may set in at different stages. When the club is “young” and/or resourceful
(abundant in all resources except those reliant on peers’ sharing), viability is the critical concern.
When it is “grown-up” and/or contentious (in some rivalrous resources), performance would be
critical instead. The ISC example suggests n as a key parameter to watch, which measures the
club size in terms of the total participation of potential contributing peers. N(n) would become
sensitive and drop significantly when n becomes large, beyond nvia say. Contention would set in
as system load increases with n, beyond nperf say. Unless nperf ≪ nvia whence the performance
perspective always dominates, the viability perspective should never be overlooked.
In cases where the non-rivalrous assumption is not appropriate and sharing costs are
significant [7], e.g. in processing, storage and/or network bandwidth, penalizing free-riding non-
contributing peers would be more necessary to reduce their loading on the system and the
contributing peers. However, as pointed out in [8], there is a trend demonstrated strongly by
sharing communities on the Internet: rivalrous resources may become more like non-rivalrous as
contention is fast reduced due to decreasing costs and increasing excess in resources. Because
of this, it is plausible that viability would overtake performance as the central concern in many
peer-to-peer systems sooner or later, if not already so.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (sufficient viability condition)
With reference to figure 1, the average rate at which pc-peers join the club of current size n is:
rjoin = (N(n)− n) P¯ (n)
while that of leaving is:
rleave = n (1− P¯ (n))
Hence, the net influx of pc-peers is given by:
rinflux
△
= rjoin − rleave = N(n) P¯ (n)− n (8)
For an empty club, n = 0,
rinflux = N(0) P¯ (0)
=
∑
i∈N (0)
∑
s
hi(s)(1 − e
−ρiφ0 g(s)) (9)
When φ0 > 0, rinflux is strictly positive since the proposition implies N(0) > 0. The empty
club is unstable and would grow in this case.
When φ0 = 0, P¯ (0) = 0 and rinflux = 0. The empty club is at equilibrium. However, its
stability depends on the quantity
∂rinflux
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n=0
= N(0)P¯ ′(0) + P¯ (0)N ′(0)− 1
= N(0)P¯ ′(0)− 1
=
∑
i∈N (0)
k¯ρi
∑
s
g(s)hi(s)− 1
≥ N(0)k¯ρ(0+)− 1
> 0 (10)
as implied by the proposition. The empty club is therefore also unstable and would grow at the
slightest perturbation. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (necessary viability condition)
According to equation (1), the contribution condition of peer i is given by:
(
∂Pi
∂Ki
∣∣∣∣
Ki=0
)−1
< Γi .
N(0) > 0 only if:
∂Pi
∂Ki
∣∣∣∣
n=0,Ki=0
> 0
for some peer i. However,
∂Pi
∂Ki
∣∣∣∣
n=0,Ki=0
=
∂(ρiΦ)
∂Ki
∑
s
g(s)hi(s)e
−ρi Φg(s)
∣∣∣∣∣
n=0, Ki=0
for which it is necessary that:
0 <
∂(ρiΦ)
∂Ki
∣∣∣∣
n=0,Ki=0
= ρ′(0)φ0
Q.E.D.
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